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Intervention
Sanctuaries as Anachronism and Anticipation
Massimiliano Tomba
Jürgen Quantz, pastor at the Heilig-Kreuz-Kirche in Berlin and founder of the 
German movement BAG Asyl in der Kirche, in an interview in November 2016, 
recounted his experience with migrants who told him what he had to do.1
They asked us what can we do? I was a priest here since 1980. They asked, Can’t you 
help us? I said, Yes, what should we do? They said, You have an old right—asylum 
in the church. It is from the medieval period. In the Bible you can find stories—come 
into the sanctuary. This is your tradition, you should do it. I initially said No. I said, 
Here we have modern laws and rights. But they said, We think you should. I said 
Okay, I’ll discuss it with my members of council. I lived with my family here—one 
night they knocked. I opened the door and the young people came and said it had to 
happen now. So I let them in.2
 The sanctuary movement reached a certain degree of popularity in the 
U.S. in the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan began deporting refugees 
to their countries of origin. More than five hundred churches (and not only 
Christian churches) established themselves as sanctuaries for political asy-
lum. From the 1980s to the present, this movement has continued its work, 
often away from the media’s spotlight and the attention of political groups. 
In the U.S. the sanctuary movement is once again receiving attention due 
to Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant policies. In Italy, the mayors of some 
cities have decided not to apply the restrictive legal provisions required by 
the decree on security and immigration of 2018 drafted by Minister Salvini. 
Similar phenomena are taking place in Belgium, France, Poland, and other 
states.
 It is easy to understand the practice of sanctuaries in moral terms, as a 
general benevolence towards migrants. But in an apparently opposite sense, 
sanctuaries can also be understood as complementary to neoliberal policies 
that operate on the basis of exclusionary criteria, distinguishing between 
migrants who are legal or illegal and those who are worthy or not of being 
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helped. In this case, sanctuaries take the place of the state in providing care 
and making distinctions between worthy and unworthy migrants.3 However, 
these perspectives—sanctuary as moral shelters or as appendages of neo-
liberal governmentality—are locked in a binary opposition between morals 
and politics both of which are inadequate for exploring the field of possibili-
ties that sanctuary practice can disclose. Nevertheless, even if a sanctuary 
can come with risks of being a new kind of containment and refuge left to 
the host’s discretion, I want to argue that we need to treat sanctuaries as 
practice and institution, based on theoretical and conceptual foundations 
of their own. Sanctuaries are neither solely about serving “victims,” nor are 
they instances of mere opposition to state anti-immigration policies.
 Pastor Jürgen Quantz began the sanctuary movement in Germany in 1983. 
There are some points in the interview he gave that are worth examining 
more closely. The first concerns the ancient right of asylum which refers to the 
medieval tradition of sanctuaries. Another interesting element is the tension 
between that tradition and modern laws and rights, a tension that initially led Pas-
tor Quantz to say no. But the migrants, and this is a third noteworthy point, 
replied that it was “his” tradition, the tradition of the church as an alternative to 
that of the law of the modern state. Again in Germany, a pastor engaged in 
the sanctuary movement declared that “the Bible is full of stories of refugees 
[ . . .] The passage from Exodus in the Old Testament was transposed to 
our community—‘because you were strangers in the land of Egypt’”.4 He is 
echoed by another pastor who claims to have practiced sanctuary “not from 
the so-called ‘neighbourly love,’ but from such recognition, as it is said in the 
Old Testament, ‘Because you were strangers.’”5 The reference to the tradition 
of the First Testament is important because it is the text shared by Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. But it should also be emphasized that this reference 
does not serve to locate the practice of sanctuaries entirely in religion; it is 
rather a call to an authority other than that of the state. An authority, one 
could say, far more ancient and universal than that of the nation-state.
 If we want to grasp the element of novelty in the practice of sanctuaries, 
we must pay attention to the placement of this experience beyond the bi-
nary opposition of religion/secularism. This is an important displacement, 
especially since secularism has become a force for exclusion, a sort of secu-
lar religion, as, for example, in France where laïcité has become a political 
weapon used by the right and the left against Muslim migrants.6 Secularism 
is collapsing under the individual freedom it would like to support. It is no 
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longer about state neutrality; instead, it has become a political weapon, a 
device of exclusion and a source of new conflict. This is one of the many 
symptoms of a slow process of erosion of the nation-state.
 When Pastor Quantz points to the incommensurability between the an-
cient right of asylum and modern law, what emerges is a tension between dif-
ferent trajectories or temporal layers. This tension opens up unprecedented 
political possibilities in which the anachronistic medieval tradition of sanc-
tuaries presents itself not as a rigid repetition of the past, but as something 
dynamic and capable of new configurations that go beyond the secular/
religious pairing. This reactivation of the medieval tradition of sanctuaries 
encloses a rich field of experimentation with institutional forms and non-
state authorities. But to grasp this field of possibilities it is necessary, first 
of all, to free oneself from the teleological conception of history according to 
which the Middle Ages represent the pre-modern—a dark era finally over-
come by modernity. According to this conception there is only one trajectory 
that leads from the pre-state and pre-capitalist forms of the Middle Ages 
to the state in its democratic and capitalist forms of modernity. This par-
ticular conception of history was elaborated by the post-Hegelians and for 
a long time it even invalidated a substantial part of Marxism. But above all, 
teleology is a normative view of history that, ex post, traces a progressive 
line in which non-modern political, economic, and juridical configurations 
are defined as pre-modern, worthy of being abandoned and overcome. If they 
survive in modernity it is only as remnants and delays.
 When we abandon this teleological conception of history, the Middle Ages 
appear as a rich arsenal of juridical and political forms, with possibilities 
left unexplored or violently repressed, as happened in the case of the Ger-
man peasant revolt of 1525. The Hegelian philosophy of history considers 
Luther a fundamental step in the progress of the consciousness of freedom 
and neglects Thomas Müntzer since he was defeated by “history.” From this 
perspective, Müntzer is worthy of neglect because he is a deviation from the 
established course of the unilinear conception of history that culminates 
in European modernity. Abandoning this teleological vision, the Middle 
Ages do not find a necessary outcome in capitalist and state modernity, 
but appear as an arsenal of possibilities, a clump of roads not taken and 
historical layers that continue to run alongside the dominant trajectory of 
Western modernity. The tradition of sanctuaries is one of these layers. If 
we can speak of the practice and tradition of sanctuaries as anachronism it is 
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only in the sense of a temporal friction between different historical layers. 
Not an opposition, but a field of possibilities.
 The point is to avoid the dead-end of the contrast between the law of the 
church and that of the state, and instead to direct one’s sights and practice 
towards other possibilities. These possibilities are constantly hidden by the 
juridical mechanism of the modern state and by the synchronization of each 
institution to the temporality of modern political sovereignty.
Sanctuary as illegalism
“Within a country’s borders there should be no place which is outside the law. 
Its power should follow every citizen like a shadow. [ . . .] To increase the num-
ber of asylums is to create so many little sovereign states, because where the 
laws do not run, there new laws can be framed opposed to the common ones 
and there can arise a spirit opposed to that of the whole body of society. The 
whole of history shows that great revolutions, both in states and in the views 
of men, have issued forth from places of asylum.”7 Cesare Beccaria’s discourse 
has fascinated liberals who typically see only one side of his claim for unitary 
sovereignty, i.e. that no one be outside the law or above the law. What liberals 
do not see is what a state can do in the name “of the whole body of society,” 
when it follows every citizen like a shadow follows the body.
 Beccaria’s discourse against asylum (sanctuaries) is symptomatic of a 
way of understanding the relationship between state power and the rights 
of the individual. Beccaria’s name is commonly associated with the criti-
cism of torture in the name of the defense of individual rights as the basis 
of the legitimacy of the state. The crucial issue is that the “progressive” side 
of Beccaria’s discourse on individual rights is made one with his critique of 
asylum which, by shattering sovereignty, would constitute an attack against 
the dogma of unity of the nation-state, the monopoly of state power, the 
depoliticization of the social. It is a typically liberal way of understanding 
the relationship between freedom and power: the former is individual, the 
latter monopolized by the state. The dominant political modernity is char-
acterized by an enormous process of singularization and synchronization in 
which the different libertates of groups and associations are atomized into the 
singular freedom of the individual; the numerous corporative and collective 
auctoritates are shattered and subsumed in the state monopoly of power. In 
historical terms, this process can be described as the original accumulation 
of political power.
HoP 9_2 text.indd   220 7/31/19   10:54 AM
History  of the Present
221
 Beccaria’s enlightenment expresses a way of understanding the relation-
ship between society and state totally befitting this process: starting here, 
sovereignty is concentrated in the hands of the state and society is individu-
alized and deprived of political power. State power finds no real counter-
power existing within society but, according to what will become a liberal 
dogma, limits itself through procedural and constitutional mechanisms of 
the rule of law. But the history of the last two and a half centuries has re-
peatedly shown that the limit that power places on itself can be continually 
redefined or even suspended in the name of real or presumed emergencies. 
This is what happens repeatedly in many states today: from the state’s point 
of view, migrants constitute an emergency against which physical walls and 
legal barriers are built. Other states turn into authoritarian states without 
a formal constitutional break. Almost everywhere, executive power bullies 
the other powers and takes the place to which the legislative body is right-
fully entitled. The current situation shows the bankruptcy of a worn-out 
regulatory package built on a vaguely liberal-democratic conception of the 
state. It is not a question of issuing an updated normative package from 
above. Rather, it is a matter of extracting a sort of exemplary normativity 
from contemporary events—a normativity that takes shape in the practices 
and risks of politics. It is with this perspective that, in these pages, I intend 
to look at sanctuaries.
 Beccaria and his liberal followers, including the attorney prosecuting 
the Tucson activists, subscribe to the same discourse: “Within a country’s 
borders there should be no place which is outside the law.”8 This is echoed by 
the prosecutor: “if this Government is going to represent all the people of this 
nation, it cannot favor those which commit criminal acts and contend that 
they are immune from prosecution, because they are motivated by a higher 
authority.”9 Sovereignty is one and indivisible. This logic can be traced back 
through the history of political thought up to Hobbes. If this is the case, then 
from the point of view of the state, something that is far more subversive than 
giving shelter to undocumented migrants lurks around the term “sanctuar-
ies” and their tradition. From the point of view of the state, religious freedom 
is a private freedom and must remain so. Religious freedom is guaranteed 
within the category of fundamental rights; cults can freely proliferate only 
in the private sphere of individual liberties. Sanctuaries, be they churches, 
practice, or tradition, go beyond the private sphere in which the modern state 
has confined religion and claim an authority that, from the point of view of 
HoP 9_2 text.indd   221 7/31/19   10:54 AM
222
interVentions •  Tomba
the state, they should not have. The prosecutor, in order to deny any refer-
ence to a “higher authority,” unwittingly put himself in a difficult position 
when he “told jurors that there was nothing in the Bible that told believers 
to break the law.”10 In this way the prosecutor affirmed the state monopoly 
of the exact interpretation of the Bible and, to demarcate the separation 
between church and state, he himself violated that separation, transform-
ing the state‘s representative into a theologian. The practice of sanctuaries, 
their reference to a “higher authority,” had rendered that demarcation fluid, 
together with that of public and private, legal and illegal. Let’s see what this 
opposition consists of.
 In one of the last chapters of Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault deals 
with the relationship between illegalities and delinquency. The penalty here 
is represented as a way of dealing with illegalities that often intersect social 
conflicts and struggles against political regimes. Mainly interested in the 
production of the criteria of exclusion, discipline, and transformation of 
illegalism (illégalisme) into delinquency, Foucault characterizes illegalism 
in oppositional terms, such as French peasants’ refusal to pay taxes, refusal 
of conscription, or refusal of a new proprietary regime. It is about “illegal 
practices” against the “law itself and the justice whose task it was to apply 
it; against local landowners who introduced new rights; against employers 
who worked together, but forbade workers’ coalitions; against entrepreneurs 
who introduced more machines.”11 In essence, according to Foucault, it is 
against the new forms of law and the rigors of regulations, as well as against 
the new regime of land ownership and legal exploitation of labor, that the 
opportunities for infractions multiply and illegalities develop. With the 
notion of illegalism, Foucault wants to highlight the multiple practices of 
differentiation, categorization, hierarchization, and social management of 
behaviors defined as undisciplined.12 Foucault’s remarkable contribution lies 
in having shown how the penal system, imposed beginning in the eighteenth 
century and affirmed by the French Revolution, tends not merely to repress 
illegalisms, but rather to differentiate them. Foucault traces this history 
by analyzing the legal categories and institutions designed to control and 
sanction illegalism.
 But the category has a limit. It takes shape and makes sense only when a 
multiplicity of practices is subsumed in what is prescribed or forbidden by 
the legal code; that is, when the code system has already replaced another 
right, such as a pre-existing common law. From the point of view of those 
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who practice common law, not only is there no illegalism, but the same cat-
egory of resistance is inadequate. These are not individuals who act against 
the new forms of law and the rigors of regulations, but rather communities 
that operate under a different legal regime. The clash is between two legal 
orders or, in other words, between two or more distinct political and juridi-
cal temporalities in conflict with each other. This has happened repeatedly 
during the nineteenth century in France, the twentieth century in Russia, and 
today in Chiapas, Mexico, and Bolivia. Those who disobey the legal regime 
of modern property relations do so not simply against it, but because they 
obey a different order of duties and rights based on different customs and 
traditions.
 History written by Foucault, however brilliant, is a history written from 
the point of view of the new legal order that recodes, disciplines, and con-
trols practices that the order itself defines as illicit, but which for a long time 
coexisted alongside the code, not as illegalisms, but as customs, traditions, 
and different legal systems. What interests Foucault is how these practices 
are punished; their tradition and autonomous life, interest him less. For 
Foucault, they become objects of interest only when they are already caged 
in the new legal system, which encodes them in terms of illegalism.
 Things appear differently as soon as we consider the practice of sanctuar-
ies in light of traditions and customs that have an autonomous life, inde-
pendent of the grasp of penal institutions and the state. They constitute an 
anachronism open to innovative political outcomes. If state rationality tends 
to synchronize them until they become either its appendices or forms of il-
legalism, the challenge begins when this binary logic is called into question. 
From the point of view of the state, when non-legal practices are inscribed 
in a binary code that recodes them as illegal, there may be removals, resis-
tances, conflicts, but not real alternatives, which instead may emerge when a 
different authority is evoked. This is what the migrants remind Pastor Jürgen 
Quantz of. Instead of opposition or disobedience to state laws, a friction 
takes place between political temporalities and trajectories characterized 
by different, incommensurable juridical grammars.
 It can be instructive to see the encounter/clash of these distinct gram-
mars in a courtroom. Here are the facts: in the 1980s, in the U.S., activists 
of the sanctuary movement organized a network of congregations which, 
proclaiming themselves to be sanctuaries, hosted undocumented migrants 
from Central America. In doing so they violated the existing legislation on 
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asylum and immigration rights. From the point of view of the state, these 
were illegal practices. The activists were accused of plotting against the U.S. 
government and the sentences reached up to five years in prison and various 
fines. The state’s response, according to the prosecutor, was that a country, 
as sovereign, “has the absolute power to control their borders;”13 that only 
the state has the authority to apply the law and the responsibility to punish 
criminals; that private citizens, in this case activists, have no right to host 
“undocumented migrants” and, even less, the authority to determine the 
legal status of immigrants.
 This was the outcome of the trial—unexceptional, from the point of view 
of state legality. But if we rewind the tape, we can review the facts from the 
point of view of the Tucson activists. They defined their practice as a “civil 
initiative,” emphasizing that it was not “civil disobedience.”14 This distinc-
tion was not just terminology or a legal ploy to avoid tougher penalties. For 
the activists it was not a question of disobeying unjust laws, but of giving 
effectiveness to just laws that the government was ignoring. In other words, 
the words of the activists, their civil initiative, unlike civil disobedience, be-
come law by practicing natural rights.15 Civil initiative is neither resistance 
to injustice nor a petition for justice to be done: “civil initiative means doing 
justice.”16 It is a practice based on the “powers of the community rather than 
the government.”17 In this regard, the civil initiative forecasts a third possible 
political trajectory beyond the dichotomy of legality/illegality.
 Two different legal grammars were facing each other. The state coherently 
expressed its own point of view. The public prosecution reaffirmed the mo-
nopoly of state power to determine and control the borders, to punish illegal-
isms and to repress the attempt by private subjects to claim for themselves 
some authority not granted and legitimized by the state. In other words, the 
state reiterated its binary grammar based on private/public, legal/illegal, 
citizen/foreign, friend/enemy pairings. Reaffirming, as the prosecution did, 
that the activists were private citizens and therefore lacking the authority to 
act as they had, meant, on the one hand, redefining their activity as illegal 
and, on the other, accusing them of having challenged the monopoly of state 
power. The state could, at best, understand the language of civil disobedience, 
but it could not, in any way, recognize in the practice of the activists any kind 
of legal activity. The binary logic of state legality had been challenged by a 
third political temporality, beyond the dualism of obedience/disobedience. 
Referring to their own practice in terms of legal activity, the Tucson activists 
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implicitly referred to another legal discourse and to another authority: the 
authority to intervene in the legal field of asylum law and immigration leg-
islation. In essence, by making their position towards the state even more 
difficult, they claimed a different authority as the source of legitimization for 
their legal practice. Along with the medieval tradition of sanctuaries, there is 
the tradition of natural rights that emerges in the practices and discourses 
of the activists. That tradition re-emerged countless times in French revo-
lutionary assemblies in 1793 and in the program of a universal Republic 
during the Paris Commune. We are talking about those authentic natural 
rights that are understood, not as they have already been incorporated in a 
code, but as rights still to be gained.
Sanctuaries of democratic practice
“We believe Sanctuary is a vision continuously created through decades of 
struggle, through thousands of years of struggle.” Thus, begins the Statement 
on Sanctuary published in 2017 by the New Sanctuary Movement of Phila-
delphia.18 This sentence is important because, on the one hand, it recalls a 
tradition of sanctuaries that dates back thousands of years and, on the other, 
it recalls a history of struggles that from time to time redefined the political 
space of the sanctuary. It is a non-static, museum tradition, yet it is alive 
and articulated through conflicts that keep the space of democracy open. 
Because this is precisely what is at stake: the inseparability between conflict 
and democratic practice. In this connection the sanctuary takes shape as “a 
vision:” “We are working, organizing, reaching and yearning towards that 
vision—a vision of collective and personal transformation.” Where democ-
racy is actually experienced, a political miracle that fuses together individual 
and collective transformation takes place. This is an ancient political posi-
tion that poses the question of change as a primary issue of politics.
 Ontario Sanctuary Coalition activists, in contact with those in Tucson, 
have gone so far as to define their practice as “a state within the state,” 
questioning the state monopoly of power and acting as a public author-
ity.19 It should be emphasized here that the practice of civil initiative does 
not reproduce the state, but brings out a conception of politics in which the 
constitutive barriers of modern political configuration, such as inclusion and 
exclusion, friends and enemies, citizens and foreigners, are eroded together 
with the separation between spiritual and temporal. The spiritual dimen-
sion acts as a bond (religio), as a link based on the practices that define the 
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space-time of the sanctuary. These practices are directed neither against 
the state nor to make the state do something for migrants. Rather, they are 
guided by an idea of justice that goes beyond the borders of the state. The 
idea of brotherhood, which from biblical texts goes on to constitute the in-
candescent core of the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen, is here reactivated to fuse together the particular 
and universal in the practice of sanctuaries. This fusion is not intellectual. 
It does not work, nor can it be built, in the laboratories of political theory. 
It is realized in the practice of brotherhood.
 This notion should not be channeled solely into the small-minded trajec-
tory of nationalism, as has often been done by modern political theory. The 
nation-state was only one of the possible outcomes of the Revolution. An 
outcome that established itself by blocking, with exceptional state violence, 
other possible trajectories. However, these have not disappeared without 
leaving traces. The call to brotherhood formed the emblem of the workers’ 
movement in 1848, in 1871 and in numerous other events. It re-emerges 
in the movement of sanctuaries because if human beings are brothers, the 
fundamental political question is not, in a Schmittian way, to divide them 
between friends and enemies. One can choose friends, not brothers and 
sisters. With brothers and sisters, we must learn not only to live together, 
but to live together in the right way.
 From this perspective, disagreement and conflict are always possible—we 
only need to learn how to handle them in a mature way. This is perhaps the 
most important task of sanctuaries as practice: the coincidence between 
changes in external circumstances and human activity as self-education for 
self-transformation. In the practice of sanctuaries, activists and refugees test 
new forms of social bonds and subjectivation. The refugees are not victims 
here, passive and vulnerable, but common brothers, sisters and actors in 
experiments in which the state is kept at a distance without opposing them. 
It is through these secondary roads that a revolutionary practice, which has 
stopped mimicking the state, takes shape.
 The modern state has established itself as a powerful mechanism for 
neutralizing conflict. It has made its own subjects infantile because they are 
unable to resolve disputes, fearful because they are frightened of the risk of 
a violent death, anxious because they are unable to face the instability that 
derives from conflict. In other words, the state produces perfect Hobbesian 
individuals. They are the result of the state mechanism that Hobbes astutely 
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elevated to an anthropological prerequisite by building a circularity that le-
gitimizes the state while at the same time places it outside of history. The 
way out of a state of minority that Kant placed at the center of his enlight-
enment plan must be updated in these terms: immaturity is the inability to 
face conflict and instability; the need for the state to be guarantor in every 
social relationship. The way out of a state of minority is a mature practice 
of politics that includes conflict and is capable of dealing with the anxiety 
that comes from instability and change.
 If the paradigms of resistance, revolution, and disobedience are still de-
termined by their subordination to the grammar of the state, civil initiative 
is an experiment that tries to speak, perhaps still stuttering, a different lan-
guage. We must, modestly, try to extract a new conceptual grammar from 
this language.20
On the political use of anachronisms
Now if in the Middle Ages churches could offer sanctuary to the most common of 
criminals, could they not do the same today for the most conscientious among us? 
And if in the Middle Ages they could offer forty days to a man who had committed 
a sin and a crime, could they not today offer an indefinite period to one who had 
committed no sin?21
 In these terms, in 1966, the Reverend William Sloane Coffin Jr., revitalized 
the tradition of sanctuaries to give hospitality to young people who refused 
to go to war in Vietnam. For his actions, the Reverend Coffin was arrested 
and convicted of conspiring against the United States.
 In an essay on the notion of authority, Myriam Revault d’Allones showed 
that if space is the matrix of power, in the sense that power determines 
boundaries and exclusions, time is the matrix of authority, in the sense that it 
concerns the link between the past and the present, the tension between con-
tinuity and discontinuity.22 The anachronism of sanctuaries, their reference 
to the Middle Ages and to an even older tradition, serves as an anticipation 
of new political configurations. The reference to the medieval tradition of 
sanctuaries is not romantic; it is anachronistic in the sense that it interrupts 
the temporality of the state and opens up a field of possibilities for new 
juridical and political configurations.
 Tradition is never something static. Referring to it as an alternative to 
the present has, or may have, subversive traits. The practice of sanctuaries 
encompasses some of these subversive possibilities. Reference to a medieval 
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tradition emerged in the assemblies of the sans-culottes during the French 
Revolution, in the associations of the Paris Commune, in the soviets and 
the councils of the twentieth-century revolutions. These were the local 
freedoms of the communes and the imperative mandate as a democratic 
institution founded on a plurality of local authorities against the state mo-
nopoly of power. In a constitutional draft written in November 1918 during 
the revolution in Bavaria, we read that the “revolution has already begun to 
return (zurückkehren) to the true democracy that we can find in the medieval 
constitutions of municipalities and provinces, in Norway and Switzerland, 
and especially in the sectional assemblies of the French Revolution.”23 This 
return (zurückkehren) to the “true democracy” of the Middle Ages is far from 
nostalgic. It is an alternative political tradition, at the base of which there 
are no “atomized voters who have abdicated from their power” but “mu-
nicipalities, corporations and associations that determine their destiny 
in assemblies.”24 In this sense, the Middle Ages appear not as a pre-modern 
configuration, as they would appear from the perspective of a teleological 
conception of history, but as an enormous arsenal of non-modern juridical, 
economic, and political concepts and practices. This is what the practice of 
sanctuaries and the alternative tradition of insurgent universality have in 
common: both make reference to possibilities that have remained blocked 
in the past.25
 The tradition of sanctuaries, far older than Christianity, re-emerged in the 
Middle Ages. In the thirteenth century the number of sanctuary churches in 
England and northern France exceeded 30,000.26 The end of this tradition 
retrospectively illuminates the sense of the practice of sanctuaries. Well 
before Beccaria, in the sixteenth century the attack on sanctuaries took place 
in the clash between the plurality of coexisting authorities and legal systems 
and the (proto)modern sovereign attempt to impose a new homogeneous 
and synchronized territorial space together with a new conception of pun-
ishment. An attack that, in the sixteenth century, saw the nascent sovereign 
state and Lutheranism as allies.27
 The conception of punishment offers a privileged point of view for un-
derstanding the medieval practice of sanctuaries, but it must be looked at 
not only from the point of view of punishment, but also from that of the 
regulation of conflict. Keep in mind that medieval English law was not wor-
ried about the fact that refugees in a sanctuary could avoid punishment.28 
In fact, the roots of the practice of sanctuaries are found in the practice of 
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intercessio which, in Roman society, corresponded to an institutional proce-
dure of reciprocal limitation of powers and intervention of a third party in a 
dispute in order to avoid injustice.29 In the late fourth century, this Romanist 
tradition intersected with ecclesiastical tradition and was given over to the 
authority of the bishops. For a fixed period of time, generally forty days, 
the sanctuary churches housed subjects who had violated a law in order to 
reach an agreement between the parties and allow for reconciliation. It was 
a crucial institution in a society characterized by a plurality of authorities, 
where a wrongdoing, a reparation, or an act of revenge could easily give rise 
to a feud. Using and mixing different traditions, the medieval juridical order 
had internally created an institution capable of preventing the escalation of 
conflicts through another way of understanding punishment and regulat-
ing conflicts. If the practice of sanctuaries was not widespread in Italy, one 
reason for its absence can be traced to the fact that the local governments, at 
least until the fourteenth century, had as their primary purpose a reconcili-
ation between the criminal and the victim, and not the punishment of the 
offender.30 In other words, sanctuaries were not present in Italy, not because 
of the weakness of the church, but because they were not necessary.
 Looking at things from a modern Western point of view, it is easy to high-
light the instability of the medieval order in which the plurality of authorities 
and legal systems, including sanctuaries, was always on the verge of produc-
ing conflicts and feuds. This is the perspective of Cesare Beccaria. However, 
if we change our perspective, the practice of sanctuaries shows rather a way 
to deal with conflict in the presence of a plurality of authorities or, in modern 
terms, in the absence of the state monopoly of power. Against the modern 
paradigm of the neutralization of conflict through the singularization and 
monopolization of public power in the hands of the state, sanctuaries present 
a non-modern alternative to the regulation of conflict, and not only because 
of the religious dimension to which they refer. The practice of sanctuaries 
should not be read through the moralizing lenses of the benevolence of the 
church, ready to give hospitality to criminals, but as the anomaly, in modern 
terms, of intercessio, of a suspension of space and sovereign time by means 
of another authority. It is this anomaly that lurks in the anachronism of the 
medieval tradition of sanctuary.
 Anachronism, in political terms, is the gateway to tertium datur, the third 
possible way which interrupts the unilinear vision of historical time. As sug-
gested earlier, what emerges from the practice of the sanctuary movement 
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is something more profound than civil disobedience to laws judged morally 
unjust. It is a challenge to the binary logic of the state through the practice 
of an extra-state authority, which some activists named civil initiative. If 
the activists define their practice as “legal activity,” the question concerns 
the nature of the authority based on which their activity can be defined as 
legitimate within a legal regime that does not coincide with that of the state. 
We can begin to shed light on this authority, as a practice, if we abandon the 
vision of the vulnerability of refugees and migrants as victims. We need to 
look at the practice of sanctuaries not so much as places where one escapes 
from a danger, but as places to which one runs to seek alternative human, 
social, and political relations.31 These are institutions that, if placed out-
side the legality of the state, are at the same time characterized by their 
intrinsic legality. In fact, if one can speak of the legality of the practice of 
sanctuaries, as the Tucson activists have, it is pursuant to an authority that 
has a non-state origin and is not defined in opposition to the state, but as 
another tradition and alternative political trajectory to that of the modern 
nation-state. These are archaic, or anachronistic, institutions that represent 
a “democratic counterthrust to statism.”32 In the reactivation of sanctuar-
ies today, one can see not only the need to give hospitality to migrants, but 
above all a need for democracy that exceeds not just this or that particular 
state law, but the logic of the modern state as such—its monopoly of power 
and its binary logic built on exclusion and depoliticization.
 Perhaps new institutional figures are emerging in the crisis of the state 
and some of its fundamental categories. Perhaps the practice and tradition 
of sanctuaries emerges not as a response to a strong state, but to a state 
scaled down by neoliberal policies which reacts by activating its primordial 
sovereign functions: exclusion, borders, security.
 It is in this way that now, in the present situation, the “revolutionary prac-
tice” of sanctuaries can be thought of. To do this it is good to go back to the 
Statement on Sanctuary of 2017: “This disastrous political moment is also the 
birth of something big and beautiful and powerful. It is the birth of an ex-
panded Sanctuary for everyone. [ . . .] This is a vision defined and organized 
by undocumented people who have lived in the urgency all along. [ . . .] This 
is the moment to build bridges with different communities and join forces. 
We see Sanctuary as the umbrella that covers all of us from the storm, and 
the womb to birth a new world. We are committed to the work of building 
not just a Sanctuary City, but a Sanctuary world.” Sanctuaries can constitute 
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a virtuous anachronism that anticipates a different, non-state, political way 
of being together.
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